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To Protect the Right to Vote, 
Look to State Courts and State 
Constitutions
Joshua A. Douglas*
What is the right to vote? This question has befuddled courts, law professors, historians, and policymakers for years. We hear that the right to vote is “fundamental,”1 the “essence of a democratic 
society,”2 and “preservative of all rights.”3 We know that voting is sacred. Yet we are 
still searching for a solution to the puzzle of how best to protect voting rights. On the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act, as voting rights advocates and scholars 
reflect on the history of voting protections and propose new reforms, the answer to 
this question is right in front of us: state constitutions and state courts.
Part of the difficulty in protecting the right to vote as robustly as possible is that 
the U.S. Constitution does not provide an explicit individual right to vote. This might 
seem surprising given that voting is one of our most cherished rights.4 But the U.S. 
Constitution confers only “negative” rights, or prohibitions on governmental action, 
as opposed to specifically stated grants of individual liberties.5 Yet virtually every state 
constitution confers the right to vote to its citizens in explicit terms. Moreover, the 
U.S. Constitution directs the inquiry over voter eligibility to state sources.6 As Justice 
Scalia recently declared, the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution “empowers 
Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them,”7 
and instead leaves voter eligibility rules to the states.
Why, then, has this avenue of protecting the right to vote not garnered more sup­
port? There are several possible reasons. First, even though state courts are primary 
actors in shaping the right to vote, most people pay less attention to state judges than 
to their federal counterparts. The media, for example, spend relatively little time 
* Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College 
of Law. This Issue Brief is a summary of two scholarly articles on the topic of the right to vote and state 
court decision making: Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 Ohio State L.J. 1 (forth­
coming 2016) and Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 89 
(2014). Thanks to both the Vanderbilt Law Review and the Ohio State Law Journal for granting permission 
to reprint some of this material. Thanks also to Nathaniel Fowler for his assistance in distilling the two 
articles into this Issue Brief. Finally, thanks to The Proteus Fund for sponsoring some of this research.
1 E.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); see also Joshua A. Douglas, Is 
the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 cornell J.l. & Pub. Pol’y 143, 145 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, 
Bush v. Gore and the Future of  Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 fla. st. u.l. rev. 377, 378–79 (2001).
2 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
3 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
4 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 144–45.
5 See, e.g., Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of  Our Rights: The Right to 
Health in State Constitutions, 60 case w. res. l. rev. 997, 1005 (2010).
6 U.S. const. art. I, § 4.
7 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2250 (2013).
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covering state voting rights decisions.8 Most election law scholars focus primarily on 
decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court. This is inherently backward given how active 
state courts are in regulating the voting process.9 Another, and perhaps weightier, 
reason is that state courts, much like federal courts, have largely underenforced the 
right to vote because they have too closely followed federal voting­rights jurisprudence. 
A renewed focus on the power of state constitutions and state judges provides a solu­
tion for how best to protect the fundamental right to vote.
This Issue Brief details the scope of voting rights under state constitutions, an 
overlooked source of the right to vote. Part I considers both the lack of a federal con­
stitutional right to vote and the explicit right mentioned in virtually all state constitu­
tions. Part II describes recent state­level voter ID cases, providing a summary of how 
courts facing litigation over voter ID laws have employed their state constitutions. 
Part III contends that state courts, instead of simply following narrow federal juris­
prudence in “lockstep,” should give broader, independent force to their explicit state 
constitutional provisions conferring the right to vote. Part IV highlights how different 
state judges construe their state constitutions, either broadly or narrowly, with respect 
to voting rights and posits that we should consider both judicial ideology and the 
method of judicial selection if we seek broad enforcement of these state constitutional 
provisions. Finally, an Appendix presents a chart, initially published in the Vanderbilt 
Law Review, illustrating all fifty state constitutions and the language they employ for 
the right to vote.10 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON THE RIGHT TO VOTE
There are two sources of constitutional rights: the U.S. Constitution and state 
constitutions. Because the former is the “Supreme Law of the Land,” it provides the 
“floor” of individual rights.11 State constitutions, on the other hand, can grant more 
robust rights. Following this formula, although the U.S. Constitution merely implies 
the right to vote, almost all state constitutions explicitly enumerate this right. Because 
the right to vote provides the foundation of our democracy,12 we must understand 
comprehensively the differing scope of federal and state constitutional protection. This 
Part provides details on how the U.S. Constitution and each of the fifty state constitu­
tions treat the right to vote.
A. The lACk of A SpeCIfICAlly enumerATed federAl rIghT To VoTe
As stated above, the U.S. Constitution does not confer the right to vote explicitly. 
Rather, it sets limitations on the government’s ability to curtail voting rights. The 
Constitution mentions individual voting seven times—in Article I, Section 2 and in 
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty­Fourth, and Twenty­Sixth 
8 See Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 ky. l.J. 553, 567 (2014) (citing Martin 
Kaplan, Ken Goldstein & Matthew Hale, Local News Coverage of  the 2004 Campaign: An Analysis of  
Nightly Broadcasts in 11 Markets, Local News Archive 9–12, 28–29 (Feb. 15, 2005), http://www.localnews­
archive.org/pdf/LCLNAFinal2004.pdf).
9 As a general matter state courts issue thousands more decisions than federal courts every year, af­
fecting millions more people. See Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme 
Courts, 13 u. Pa. J. const. l. 455, 456–57 (2010).
10 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 vanD. l. rev. 89, 
144–49 (2014).
11 See generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (noting that a state constitution may 
afford greater protections than the U.S. Constitution).
12 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964).
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Amendments—but none of those provisions actually grant a right to vote to U.S. citi­
zens.13 Article I, Section 2 provides that, in electing members of the House of 
Representatives, “electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for elec­
tors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.”14 That is, the U.S. 
Constitution does not provide the qualifications for voters itself but instead delegates 
that responsibility to the states, applying state eligibility rules to federal elections. The 
Seventeenth Amendment has the same language for the election of U.S. Senators.15 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s “Reduction in Representation” Clause provides that if 
a state denies the right to vote to eligible citizens (except based on participation in a 
rebellion or other crime), the state loses representation in its Congressional delega­
tion.16 This clause does not provide citizens the right to vote as an explicit liberty but 
instead details a potential penalty states will suffer if they deny that right. The 
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty­Fourth, and Twenty­Sixth Amendments all speak in 
the passive voice, providing that the right to vote “shall not be denied” according to 
race (Fifteenth),17 sex (Nineteenth),18 ability to pay a poll tax (Twenty­Fourth),19 or 
age (Twenty­Sixth).20
Given all of these textual sources of the right to vote—albeit negatively implied—it 
might seem surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court has not relied on these provisions 
but instead has located the federal right to vote within the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.21 The genesis of modern voting­rights jurisprudence comes 
from Baker v. Carr, a 1962 case in which the Supreme Court declared that “[a] citizen’s 
right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recog­
nized as a right secured by the Constitution.”22 Subsequent cases placed the right to 
vote squarely within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. For exam­
ple, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court acknowledged that although 
the U.S. Constitution does not specifically confer a right to vote in state elections, 
“once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are 
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”23 
Later cases, however, lowered the judicial scrutiny that regulations on the right to 
vote receive. In Anderson v. Celebrezze and Burdick v. Takushi, the Court developed 
a framework for considering federal constitutional challenges to state voting 
13 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of 
Mirrors, 115 Harv. l. rev. 170, 208 (2001) (contrasting the fact that “nothing in the U.S. Constitution 
mentions a ‘right to vote’ in a presidential election” with the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement in Bush v. 
Gore that “[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote 
as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental”). There have been frequent calls to amend the U.S. 
Constitution to include an explicit grant of the right to vote, but these proposed amendments so far have 
not had much traction. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 44, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS­113hjres44ih/pdf/BILLS­113hjres44ih.pdf.
14 U.S. const. art. I, § 2.
15 Id. amend. XVII.
16 Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
17 Id. amend. XV.
18 Id. amend. XIX.
19 Id. amend. XXIV.
20 Id. amend. XXVI.
21 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964); see akHIl reeD 
amar, amerIca’s unwrItten constItutIon: tHe PreceDents anD PrIncIPles we lIve by 186 (2012).
22 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962).
23 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
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regulations.24 Known as the Anderson-Burdick “severe burden” test, courts first deter­
mine whether the state law in question imposes a severe burden on voters.25 If it does, 
then the Court applies strict scrutiny review.26 If the burden is less than severe, how­
ever, then the Court applies a lower, intermediate level of scrutiny, in which it balances 
the burdens the law does impose against the state’s regulatory interests. If the state’s 
interests outweigh the burden on voting, then the state law is valid, despite the fact 
that it nevertheless might restrict a so­called fundamental right.27 At the federal level, 
in other words, some state impediments to voting are constitutionally permissible, so 
long as the burden is not too severe. The federal constitutional protection for the right 
to vote is thus not particularly robust, either textually or under recent case law.
B. STATe ConSTITuTIonAl grAnTS of The rIghT To VoTe
In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, all fifty states provide explicit voting protec­
tion for their citizens. This section sets out the scope of that right, detailing state 
constitutional provisions on voter qualifications. 
Forty­nine states explicitly grant the right to vote through specific language in their 
state constitutions.28 Most of these provisions directly define who is eligible to vote, 
such as Wisconsin’s, which states that “[e]very United States citizen age 18 or older 
who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified elector of that 
district.”29 That is, state constitutions grant voting rights to all individuals who are 
citizens of the United States, residents of the state for a certain period preceding the 
election, and over eighteen years old. Certain state constitutions then explicitly deny 
voting rights to convicted felons or mentally incompetent persons.30 A few state con­
stitutions allow the state’s legislature to enact other “necessary” voting procedures to 
root out fraud or protect the integrity of the election process.31 But at bottom, state 
constitutions include specific language granting voting rights to the state’s citizens.
As an added level of protection, twenty­six states include a provision in their con­
stitutions stating that elections shall be “free,” “free and equal,” or “free and open.”32 
Although these terms might seem amorphous, several state courts have construed this 
language as guaranteeing all eligible voters access to the ballot. As Kentucky’s highest 
court long ago explained—in a passage that several other courts have cited33—a con­
stitutional provision declaring elections to be “free and equal” is “mandatory”: “It 
applies to all elections, and no election can be free and equal, within its meaning, if 
any substantial number of persons entitled to vote are denied the right to do so.”34 
24 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)); 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983).
25 Id.
26 Burdick, 502 U.S. at 433–34.
27 See generally Douglas, supra note 1, at 174 (discussing how the use of the severe burden test suggests 
that the Court does not always consider the right to vote to be a “fundamental right”).
28 See infra Appendix. The only state constitution that does not include explicit language granting the 
right to vote is Arizona’s, which instead provides that no one shall have the right to vote unless they meet 
the citizenship, residency, and age requirements. This language still grants the right to vote, albeit in the 
reverse of all other states, because it provides who may not vote (no one unless they meet the state’s eligibil­
ity requirements).
29 wIs. const. art. III, § 1.
30 See, e.g., ky. const. § 145.
31 See, e.g., Del. const. art. V, § 1; mD. const. art. I, § 7.
32 See infra Appendix. 
33 Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d 1008, 1016 (N.M. 2001).
34 Wallbrecht v. Ingram, 175 S.W. 1022, 1026–27 (Ky. 1915).
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Finally, fifteen state constitutions mirror the U.S. Constitution in delineating voting 
rights through indirect, negative language declaring when the state may not infringe 
the right to vote on the basis of certain characteristics.35 Table 1 summarizes these 
state constitutional provisions on the right to vote.
TABle 1: STATe ConSTITuTIonAl proVISIonS on The rIghT To VoTe
State Constitutional Provision Number of States
Explicit grant of the right to vote 49
Elections shall be “free,” “free and equal,” or “free and open” 26
Implicit grant of the right to vote through negative language 15
In sum, state constitutions go well beyond the U.S. Constitution in protecting the 
right to vote. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, these state constitutional provisions explic­
itly grant the right to vote to all citizens who meet simple qualification rules. As dis­
cussed below, state courts should not interpret such broad constitutional provisions 
to be coextensive (or in “lockstep”) with the more limited federal jurisprudence of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution explicitly points to state voter 
eligibility rules for determining voter qualifications in federal elections, suggesting the 
paramount importance of these state constitutional provisions. State court jurispru­
dence also should be more robust than federal law because state constitutions go 
further than the U.S. Constitution in specifically conferring voting rights. That is, a 
faithful understanding of federal and state constitutional structure and of the differ­
ences between how each document grants voting rights counsel toward recognizing 
state constitutions’ independent force.
II. STATE JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETING  
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
State courts construe state constitutional provisions regarding individual rights 
either in lockstep with federal jurisprudence or more independently and robustly. This 
Part outlines the lockstep and non­lockstep methods and explains how state courts 
have construed voting­rights provisions under each interpretive lens in recent voter 
ID litigation.
A. loCkSTep
The U.S. Constitution establishes the federal floor of individual rights because the 
Supremacy Clause forbids states from providing less protection than what the U.S. 
Constitution guarantees.36 When state courts lockstep, they follow the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s lead in construing the scope of these individual rights, and in essence analyze 
the analogous rights in the state constitution as conferring the same level of protection 
35 See infra Appendix.
36 U.S. const. art. VI, cl. 2; see Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in 
the Land of  10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the United 
States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 alb. l. rev. 865, 875 (2007).
26 Advance
as their federal counterparts.37 State courts that follow the lockstep approach will 
provide the exact same protection for the right as federal courts do under the U.S. 
Constitution.38 But this is problematic when federal protection is insufficient, as is the 
case with voting rights.
Lockstepping is fairly common with regard to the right to vote.39 A prominent, 
recent example comes from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. On July 31, 2014, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court issued two opinions, one 5­2 and the other 4­3, upholding 
the state’s voter ID law, following both the U.S. Supreme Court and prior state court 
decisions in its analysis.40 
Initially two Wisconsin trial courts held that the state’s voter ID law imposed an 
impermissible qualification for voting under the Wisconsin Constitution.41 In both 
cases, plaintiffs challenged the voter ID requirements only under the Wisconsin 
Constitution, not the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs invoked 
Article III, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that all persons 
age 18 or older are qualified electors of the district in which they reside.42 Presumably, 
the plaintiffs focused their argument on the Wisconsin Constitution and did not invoke 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because they wished to avoid 
an analysis under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Crawford v. Marion 
County,43 in which the Court upheld a similar Indiana law under the Anderson-
Burdick “severe burden” balancing test. This proved successful at the trial court, with 
one court explicitly distinguishing Crawford by noting, “this case is founded upon the 
Wisconsin Constitution which expressly guarantees the right to vote while Crawford 
was based upon the U.S. Constitution which offers no such guarantee.”44 
But that strategy failed before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, largely because that 
court followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead to construe the state constitution. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the state’s voter ID requirement, adopting federal 
jurisprudence for the state constitutional question to conclude that the law did not add 
an additional qualification to vote and did not impose an undue burden on voting.45 
In the 5­2 decision, the court found that the voter ID provision did not add an addi­
tional qualification to vote beyond what the state constitution allows; in the 4­3 deci­
sion, the majority found that the voter ID requirement was not overly burdensome.46 
37 See id. at 875, 880.
38 See id. at 881.
39 As one commentator notes, lockstepping is the prevailing norm for most state constitutional adju­
dication. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of  State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 
35 InD. l. rev. 335, 338 (2002).
40 Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 469 (Wisc. 2014); League of Women Voters 
of Wis. Educ. Network v. Walker, 357 Wis.2d 360 (Wisc. July 31, 2014).
41 See League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11 CV 4669, 2012 WL 
763586 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12); Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 
739553 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2012).
42 See wIs. const. art. III, § 1.
43 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
44 Milwaukee Branch of  the NAACP, 2012 WL 739553 at *1.
45 Milwaukee Branch of  the NAACP, 357 Wis.2d at 469; League of  Women Voters of  Wis. Educ. 
Network, 357 Wis.2d at 360.
46 Milwaukee Branch of  the NAACP, 357 Wis.2d at 469; League of  Women Voters of  Wis. Educ. 
Network, 357 Wis.2d at 360. Justice Crook joined the majority in League of  Women Voters, the 5­2 deci­
sion, but joined the dissent in Milwaukee Branch of  the NAACP, the 4­3 ruling. He wrote separately in 
League of  Women Voters to explain that his decision in that case rested largely on the fact that the plaintiffs 
brought only a facial challenge to the law. He dissented in Milwaukee Branch of  the NAACP, however, 
finding that the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence of specific burdens the law imposed on voters.
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Throughout both cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and analysis in Crawford. In fact, in the 4­3 decision, 
the court explicitly followed the Supreme Court’s lead in Crawford by stating that it 
would “structure [its] discussion of plaintiffs’ challenges to [the voter ID law] consis­
tent with the method of analysis employed in Burdick and Anderson …”47 Although 
the court did not explicitly state that it was lockstepping the scope of voting rights 
under Wisconsin’s Constitution with the U.S. Constitution, its mode of analysis placed 
the two protections of the right to vote in “absolute harmony.”48 This interpretation 
means that Wisconsin’s explicit grant of voting rights in its constitution is in lockstep 
with the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause—even though those two provi­
sions are textually and substantively different. The U.S. Constitution does not explic­
itly grant the right to vote, while the Wisconsin Constitution does, yet the court 
construed the two constitutions to be coextensive and therefore substantively identical. 
This suggests that the Wisconsin Constitution’s explicit grant of the right to vote is 
irrelevant because the court simply followed the U.S. Constitution’s lead even though 
it lacks the same substantive provision.
In sum, even though virtually every state constitution contains a provision that 
explicitly grants the right to vote to its residents, many state courts, like the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, have not construed those provisions to have any separate meaning 
from federal voting­rights jurisprudence under the U.S. Constitution. Instead, these 
state courts use the lockstep method to define the scope of the clauses in their constitu­
tions, typically rejecting challenges to a state’s practice in the process. This analysis 
has an inherent dissonance, as state courts are lockstepping a specific and explicit 
state voter qualification provision with federal court interpretation of the implied right 
to vote within the general language of the federal Equal Protection Clause. The result 
is often a derogation of citizens’ constitutional right to vote.
B. non-loCkSTep
Instead of using a lockstep approach, some state courts recognize that their con­
stitutions go further than the U.S. Constitution in conferring voting rights. This meth­
odology gives state constitutions significant authority in protecting individual rights 
because it is not hampered by the more limited federal analysis. 
State courts employing a non­lockstep approach start with the notion that their 
state constitution may be broader than the U.S. Constitution.49 A court’s analysis thus 
begins and often ends with the state constitution, and the court considers the federal 
floor only if the state constitution does not cover the right in question.50 Federal con­
stitutional interpretation is merely persuasive in non­lockstep state jurisprudence, with 
no presumptive validity.51 
The Missouri Supreme Court, in its 2006 voter ID decision, set out the reasons for 
using this state­focused method quite nicely, contrasting the voter protection provisions 
in both the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions.52 The Missouri court recognized that, 
47 Milwaukee Branch of  the NAACP, 357 Wis.2d at 490.
48 See Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Speech, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: 
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 InD. l. rev. 635, 645 (1987).
49 See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 36, at 885.
50 See id. at 885; see also Utter & Pitler, supra note 48, at 647.
51 Utter & Pitler, supra note 48, at 647.
52 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211–12 (Mo. 2006) (“The express constitutional protection of 
the right to vote differentiates the Missouri constitution from its federal counterpart . . .”)
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although both the U.S. Constitution and the state’s constitution safeguard the right 
to vote, the broader state constitution provides independent and explicit voting pro­
tection.53 So construed, the voter ID law violated the Missouri Constitution’s conferral 
to Missouri citizens of a “fundamental right to vote.”54 The court acknowledged that 
the U.S. Constitution still provides a floor of protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.55 But the court, while giving credence to the 
U.S. Constitution’s more limited protection of voting rights, focused its analysis on 
the Missouri Constitution. Missouri’s constitution goes beyond the federal floor, so 
regardless of whether the law was permissible under the U.S. Constitution, the court 
invalidated it under the state constitution using the non­lockstep methodology. 
Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in rejecting that state’s voter ID law more 
recently, also recognized the primacy and independence of the state constitution’s 
conferral of voting rights.56 The court found that the four qualifications listed in the 
Arkansas Constitution (U.S. citizen, Arkansas resident, over 18, and lawfully regis­
tered) “simply do not include any proof­of­identity requirement.”57 The court also 
refused to rely on Crawford or on cases from other jurisdictions, explaining that “those 
courts interpreted the United States Constitution or their respective states’ constitu­
tions, and here, we address the present issue solely under the Arkansas Constitution.”58 
The main benefit of the non­lockstep approach for the constitutional right to vote 
is that it gives full force to the broader protection of voting rights contained within 
state constitutions. Federal case law interpreting the Equal Protection Clause is still 
important because it furnishes a baseline of constitutional protection for the right to 
vote, couched in terms of equality. It therefore provides a framework for a lower limit 
on the kinds of election regulations states may impose. But state constitutions are more 
explicit than the U.S. Constitution when it comes to the right to vote. State constitu­
tions, interpreted through a non­lockstep methodology, thus confer a more robust 
complement to federal Equal Protection Clause analysis. As explained below, there 
are strong reasons for a widespread adoption of a non­lockstep approach for all state 
constitutional cases involving the fundamental, constitutional right to vote.
III. A NON­LOCKSTEP APPROACH PROVIDES THE BEST 
INTERPRETATIVE METHOD FOR THE RIGHT TO VOTE
A. The proBlemS wITh loCkSTeppIng The  
ConSTITuTIonAl rIghT To VoTe
Textually and jurisprudentially, a non­lockstep analysis presents the best approach 
to construe the constitutional right to vote. There are at least three reasons to reject 
a lockstep methodology to interpreting voting rights under state constitutions.
First, the text of the U.S. Constitution says that states will determine voter quali­
fications.59 The U.S. Constitution does not define who has the right to vote; it delegates 
that responsibility to the states. In turn, and unlike the U.S. Constitution, state con­
stitutions specifically grant voting rights to the state’s residents. Therefore, if we are 
53 Id. at 216 (“Here, the issue is constitutionality under Missouri’s Constitution, not under the United 
States Constitution.”).
54 Id. at 212–13 (citing mo. const. art. I, § 25).
55 Id. at 216.
56 See Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2014).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 u.s. const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; u.s. const. amend. XVII.
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faithful to the U.S. Constitution’s delegation of voter eligibility rules to the states, then 
there is little with which to lockstep, beyond the amorphous standards of the Equal 
Protection Clause. It is incongruent to lockstep a state’s more specific voting rules with 
a completely different general provision of the U.S. Constitution that actually says 
nothing directly about the right to vote.
 Second, the history of the constitutional structure for voting rights portends a 
greater role for state definitions of the right to vote. Well before the adoption of the 
U.S. Constitution, state constitutions already granted the right to vote to the state’s 
citizens. The Founding Fathers likely felt no need to insert a right­to­vote provision 
in the U.S. Constitution due to the preceding direct state grants of that right.60 Instead, 
the drafters provided in Article I, Section 2 that voter eligibility for federal elections 
was dependent on state eligibility rules. This provision was a “compromise, an out­
growth both of an ideologically divided constitutional convention and the practical 
politics of constitutional ratification,” but it was possible specifically because state 
constitutions already conferred the right to vote.61 Accordingly, we need not locate the 
right to vote in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, especially given 
that it exists already within state constitutions.62
Third, lockstepping goes against the ideal of judicial federalism, which suggests 
that state constitutions should play a significant role in protecting individual liberties. 
As Justice Brennan explained in his seminal Harvard Law Review article, state courts 
should give their constitutions independent force when they disagree with U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions on an important issue of individual liberties.63 State courts that 
robustly protect rights can help to check more restrictive federal jurisprudence and, 
ultimately, national power.64 State courts should therefore use a state­focused, 
federalist­driven, non­lockstep method that allows them to recognize state constitu­
tions as more protective of voting rights than the U.S. Constitution.
B. The preSumpTIVe InVAlIdITy of eleCTIon lAwS  
ThAT Add VoTer QuAlIfICATIonS
A non­lockstep approach to state constitutional interpretation of the right to vote 
rejects the U.S. Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick standard as too deferential to 
state regulation of elections, as that test fails to recognize the explicit right of suffrage 
within state constitutions. But in its place, state courts need a workable test that ele­
vates the importance of the fundamental right to vote while still allowing jurisdictions 
60 For a fuller historical picture of founding era understanding of the Elections Clause and voter 
qualification rules, see Kirsten Nussbaumer, Republican Election Reform and the American Montesquieu 
12–13 (June 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1898406 (discussing the tradition of “fixing suffrage” through constitutional text).
61 See alexanDer keyssar, tHe rIGHt to vote 21 (2009).
62 Amar, supra note 21, at 186–87 (explaining that, at the time of its adoption, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was not understood to encompass voting rights).
63 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of  Individual Rights, 90 Harv. l. 
rev. 489, 502 (1977); cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of  Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. l. rev. 1212, 1221 (1978) (positing that “constitutional norms which are 
underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual 
limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be understood as delineating 
only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforcing the norm”).
64 See James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a 
Functional Theory of  State Constitutions, 91 Geo. l.J. 1003, 1033 (2003) (“State judicial rejection of exces­
sively narrow Supreme Court precedents concerning the scope of individual rights helps check national 
power in at least four ways.”).
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to run their elections. Again, the solution is right in front of us: the structure of state 
constitutions. Courts simply need to apply faithfully what state constitutions say.
1. State Constitutional Structure
As discussed above, all but one state constitution explicitly grants to its citizens the 
right to vote. Most of these constitutional provisions are couched in mandatory terms: 
all citizens “are qualified electors” or “shall be entitled to vote” so long as they are U.S. 
citizens, residents of the state for a certain time, and over eighteen years of age.65 
State constitutions, as previously noted, also delegate authority to state legislatures 
to regulate elections, but this comes only after the state constitutions confer voting 
rights. That is, the right to regulate elections is derivative of the people’s right to vote. 
As one Wisconsin trial court considering a voter ID law explained, the citizenry of the 
state ratified the constitution, so the citizen’s right to vote arises first, and legislative 
authority to alter that right follows.66 In addition, the constitutional power state leg­
islatures enjoy is based on permissive language and is often limited to regulating only 
certain aspects of the election process. Pennsylvania citizens, for example, “shall be 
entitled to vote at all elections subject … to such laws requiring and regulating the 
registration of electors as the General Assembly may enact.”67 Other state constitutions 
allow legislatures to pass laws involving absentee balloting or felon disenfranchise­
ment.68 Some state constitutions also permit the legislature to enact laws to “preserve 
the integrity” of elections or “guard against abuses of the elective power.”69 
State constitutions thus grant the right to vote in mandatory terms and only sec­
ondarily delegate legislative control to regulate some aspects of the election process. 
The constitution, not the legislature, confers the right to vote, so the legislature’s power 
cannot completely override this constitutional grant. A primary conferral of the right 
to vote, which then may be subject to legislative authority, is the only way to understand 
properly both the textual and contextual grant of voting rights. That is, the legisla­
ture’s power cannot outweigh the mandatory nature of the constitution’s voting pro­
tection. Courts construing these provisions in harmony, then, must give full effect to 
the mandatory, explicit nature of voting rights while still providing the legislature with 
room to regulate elections consistent with constitutional authorization.
2. A Two-Part Test for the State Constitutional Right to Vote
Given the foregoing analysis, a court considering a state constitutional challenge 
to an election regulation should ask two separate questions: (1) whether the law at 
issue infringes upon the explicit constitutional grant of voting rights by adding an 
additional qualification, and then (2) whether the exercise of the legislature’s power 
can outweigh that mandatory right. The plaintiff should have the burden of showing 
that the regulation in question imposes an additional voter qualification, while the 
state should have the ultimate burden of justifying such a law.
A plaintiff satisfies his or her initial burden under this proposed test by showing 
that the law creates categories—those who may vote and those who may not—based 
65 See, e.g., Pa. const. art. VII, § 1.
66 Order Granting Motion for Temporary Injunction, Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 
No. 11 CV 5492, 2012 WL 739553 (Wis. Cir. Mar. 6, 2012).
67 Pa. const. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added).
68 See, e.g., fla. const. art. V, § 4 (registration and absentee balloting); kan. const. art. V, § 2 (felon 
disenfranchisement).
69 See, e.g., colo. const. art. IV, § 11; n.m. const. art. V, § 1.
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on additional criteria not listed in the state constitution. For example, a voter ID law, 
in a state in which many voters do not have an ID and face substantial burdens in 
obtaining one, can be seen as an additional qualification because those voters who 
satisfy all other eligibility rules still may not vote without possessing an ID. Having an 
ID has become a qualification. In this scenario (which is the reality in most states with 
strict ID requirements) a voter ID law does more than just enforce the constitutionally­
enumerated eligibility rules, because those who meet the valid qualifications may still 
suffer disenfranchisement if they do not also have the ID. Put another way, if every 
voter possessed a valid ID, then the ID law would not be an additional qualification 
because it would not impose a status requirement on voters that some people cannot 
easily meet. Everyone would still be eligible to vote regardless of the voter ID law 
because everyone would have one, and the law would be regulating the process of vot­
ing instead of delineating an additional qualification. But that is not the reality of many 
of today’s voter ID laws. To be sure, a voter ID law in a state in which everyone owned 
an ID still might impose an added burden on voters—of bringing and presenting the 
ID—but this is different in kind from distinguishing between which voters may cast a 
ballot based on possession of an ID when not everyone can easily obtain one. If having 
an ID is not a universal trait, or the state does not otherwise accommodate those with­
out one, then the requirement turns into an additional voter qualification.
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a law imposes an additional qualification on the 
right to vote, it is then the state’s burden to show why the law is a permissible exercise 
of its legislative authority. To do so, the legislature must present specific findings on 
why the law in question does not infringe the state constitution’s explicit provision of 
voting rights to its citizens. Without specific findings, a legislature might curtail the 
constitutional right to vote through general legislative declarations—contrary to the 
text and structure of state constitutions.
This proposal flips the normal burden in constitutional voting­rights litigation. 
Under the federal Anderson-Burdick test, the plaintiff has the obligation to show that 
the law in question burdens the right to vote to a severe level.70 If the plaintiff cannot 
do so, then a lockstepping state court following Anderson-Burdick will apply an 
intermediate balancing test that largely defers to the state’s justifications for the law.71 
In essence, “laws pertaining to electoral mechanics carry a strong presumption of 
constitutionality, even though they touch upon the fundamental rights of voting and 
political association.”72 Under Anderson-Burdick, then, the plaintiff assumes the ulti­
mate burden of proving the law’s invalidity by demonstrating the barriers the law 
imposes on voting rights, and the court typically credits whatever justification the state 
posits for its election regulation.73 A court following Anderson-Burdick will reverse 
the presumption of validity and hold the state to a higher threshold only if the court 
finds that the law imposes a severe burden.74 
Flipping the normal federal framework and imposing a presumption of invalidity 
to laws that add voter qualifications is justified because state constitutions already 
support this analytical move. They explicitly confer the right to vote as an initial 
70 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
71 Id.; see Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 wasH. u. l. rev. 553 (2015). 
72 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of  Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and 
Opportunities, 156 u. Pa. l. rev. 313, 336 (2007).
73 See id. at 323; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; see also Douglas, supra note 71 (discussing the Court’s undue 
deference to states in the interest prong of the constitutional analysis).
74 See Elmendorf, supra note 72, at 336–37.
32 Advance
matter, subject only later to a grant of power that the state legislature may invoke. 
This is evident through the mandatory nature of the voting­rights provisions, the 
permissive language authorizing legislative regulation, and the simple fact that a leg­
islature’s power cannot override the explicit constitutional conferral of the fundamen­
tal right to vote. Courts should therefore consider a law that adds additional voter 
qualifications to be presumptively invalid under the state constitution because the law 
is contrary to the constitution’s explicit grant of the right to vote. The state should 
then have the burden of overcoming that presumption with direct evidence showing 
that the law is consistent with the state constitution’s specific conferral of legislative 
power to regulate elections.
This two­part, burden­shifting analysis is akin to strict scrutiny, requiring the state 
to justify an election regulation by demonstrating how it is tied specifically to the 
legislature’s power.75 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “under our 
Constitution … the States are given the initial task of determining the qualifications 
of voters who will elect members of Congress.”76 A close analysis of state constitutions 
reveals that those documents explicitly grant the right to vote in unequivocal terms, 
subject only to a few enumerated status qualifications and to the legislature’s authority, 
which is limited to certain areas in most states. Thus, state constitutions themselves 
suggest that legislatures must justify the imposition of additional voter qualifications 
that infringe the right to vote. An analysis that is similar to federal strict scrutiny 
review comes directly from the state constitutional text and structure, as well as the 
fundamental nature of the right to vote.77 
This formulation does not require widespread judicial oversight of elections, how­
ever, as states should be able to overcome the presumption of invalidity in most instances 
for run­of­the­mill election­administration laws. States need to regulate how an election 
should operate. Many election­related laws, moreover, do not impose additional voter 
qualifications but instead are about other mechanics of the election process, such as 
ballot access requirements for candidates or campaign finance regulations.78 But when 
a plaintiff can demonstrate that a particular law adds an additional voting qualification 
beyond what the state constitution permits, courts should consider the law presump­
tively invalid under the constitutional text. The state should then have the burden of 
showing with specific evidence why it was justified in passing that law. This mode of 
analysis is most faithful to a non­lockstep approach to constitutional protection of the 
right to vote and adheres most closely to state constitutional text and structure.
IV. SELECTING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES WHO WILL  
ROBUSTLY PROTECT THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Some state judges are better than others in broadly construing voting rights and 
therefore are more likely to adopt the two­part analysis described above. After all, a 
75 Using heightened scrutiny and rejecting deference to state legislatures for impediments to voting 
rights was the original formulation of the Warren Court’s right­to­vote decisions. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969) (“Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes which deny some 
residents the right to vote, the general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes and the 
traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a ‘rational basis’ for the distinc­
tions made are not applicable.”).
76 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729–30 (1974) (citing u.s. const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1).
77 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of  Meaning, 80 n.c. l. rev. 
1269, 1295 (2002).
78 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 178 (distinguishing between laws that directly impact voters with laws 
that only tangentially affect voters by regulating other aspects of the election process).
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judge who is predisposed to lockstep the state constitutional protection of voting rights 
with limited federal jurisprudence or otherwise narrowly construe the right to vote is 
unlikely to follow the proposed test. An evaluation of state right­to­vote cases may tell 
us whether ideologically liberal versus conservative judges, as well as elected versus 
appointed judges, are better at broadly construing the state­conferred constitutional 
right to vote. If the right to vote is the most fundamental right in our democracy,79 then 
we should favor judges who will issue rulings that robustly protect that right for all 
voters. This Part provides a jumping off point for analyzing how ideology and methods 
of judicial selection may help to determine how a potential judge will construe the 
constitutional right to vote. Although the data is preliminary, and further studies are 
needed, it appears that liberal and appointed judges may be better at robustly constru­
ing the right to vote as compared to their conservative and elected counterparts.
A. polITICAl Ideology
Liberal judges tend to view individual rights broadly, granting fuller protection to 
plaintiffs asserting these rights against state regulation, while conservative judges 
analyze them more narrowly.80 For example, court decisions in Wisconsin, Michigan, 
and Georgia have seemingly tracked the sitting judges’ ideologies, with the liberal 
judges ruling in favor of broader protection of the right to vote and conservative judges 
going in the opposite direction.81 Of course, ideology is not the only driver of judicial 
decision making, as legal analysis is based on law, precedent, and the facts of a par­
ticular case.82 That said, ideology often correlates with the outcome in a case, especially 
on highly­partisan issues such as election law and voting rights.83 It should come as 
no surprise, then, that a judge’s analysis of the constitutional right to vote often cor­
relates with his or her ideology. The link between ideology and interpretation of the 
constitutional right to vote is most poignant in decisions on voter ID laws.84 Most 
(although not all) of the state judges ruling on voter ID laws in the past decade have 
79 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Foundational Importance of  Voting: A Response to Professor Flanders, 
66 okla. l. rev. 81 (2013).
80 Prior empirical studies have shown that liberal and conservative judges rule differently on various 
election law issues. For example, Professors Adam Cox and Thomas Miles have found that ideology, based 
on the partisanship of the appointing President, correlates strongly with how a federal judge rules in a 
Voting Rights Act case. See Adam B. Cox & and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 
colum. l. rev. 1, 19–25 (2008). Similarly, Professors Michael Kang and Joanna Shepherd have found that 
state judges’ rulings are often consistent with the views of the political parties that funded their election 
campaigns. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of  Judicial Campaign 
Finance, 86 s. cal. l. rev. 1239 (2013).
81 See Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 oHIo state l.J. 1 (forthcoming 
2016). An important caveat is required here: I am not attempting a quantitative empirical analysis, and the 
sample size is relatively small, so the conclusions are necessarily tentative. Also, the direction of influence 
is unclear: does ideology affect the decision, or is the decision simply evidence of the judge’s ideology? But 
the analysis at least provides a first step in showing that the political identity of the judges may matter 
when deciding a voting rights controversy.
82 See, e.g., Kyle C. Kopko, Partisanship Suppressed: Judicial Decision-Making in Ralph Nader’s 2004 
Ballot Access Litigation, 7 electIon l.J. 301, 302 (2008).
83 See, e.g., Kyle Kopko, The Effect of Partisanship in Election Law Judicial Decision­Making (2010) 
(electronic theses and dissertation, Ohio State University), available at https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_fi
le?accession=osu1275415061&disposition=inline.
84 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for A Structural 
Theory of  the Right to Vote?, 35 HastInGs const. l.q. 643, 647 (2008).
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followed their ideological predilections.85 Liberal judges construe the constitutional 
right to vote broadly and therefore view voter ID laws skeptically, while conservative 
judges do the opposite.86 
Although not every Democratic or liberal judge is going to invalidate a voter ID 
law, and not every Republican or conservative judge is going to uphold a voter ID 
requirement, there is still a discernable trend, particularly regarding the scope of 
protection afforded to the constitutional right to vote under state constitutions. It may 
not be possible to categorize all judges along an ideological spectrum, and a judge’s 
constitutional analysis on this issue may have nothing to do with his or her personal 
ideological predilections. Moreover, voter ID laws come in different shapes and sizes, 
and some laws – such as the ones in Rhode Island or Colorado87 – do not necessarily 
infringe the fundamental right to vote or impose a qualification because all voters can 
easily comply with no added burden. Regardless, the analysis shows that who is decid­
ing these cases can matter a great deal88 because liberal­leaning judges seem to under­
stand more clearly that state constitutions provide broad protection to the individual 
right to vote that goes beyond federal jurisprudence.
B. JudICIAl SeleCTIon
Voting rights cases often involve challenges to state laws that have the effect of 
making it harder for typically disfavored groups to vote, such as poor people, minori­
ties, felons, or people with disabilities. Perhaps judges are more likely to rule broadly 
in construing voting rights for these individuals if the judges are more isolated from 
the political process by being appointed instead of elected, or if they face merely a 
retention election instead of a campaign against an opponent. Prior studies show that 
elected judges tend to pay more attention to public opinion than appointed judges or 
judges who must win only a “yes” or “no” retention vote to stay on the bench.89 
Retention elections for appointed judges are usually boring affairs with little political 
drama, but elected judges must actively campaign because they must beat an opponent 
who also wants the seat.90 The theory, then, is that an elected judge may be less likely 
to rule in favor of a political minority than an appointed judge who will not worry as 
much about the potential backlash from a vigorous campaign.91
The initial evidence suggests that, for issues that are not already highly ideological, 
appointed judges or judges who will face only retention elections are better at broadly 
construing the right to vote and including political minorities in the democratic 
85 For a detailed discussion of ideology and recent state court voter ID decisions, see Joshua A. Douglas, 
State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 oHIo state l.J. 1 (forthcoming 2016).
86 See Elmendorf, supra note 82.
87 See Justin Levitt, Rhode Island Voter ID Follow-up, electIon law bloG (May 23, 2012), http://
electionlawblog.org/?p=34694; Colorado Common Cause v. Davidson, No. 04­CV­7709, 2004 WL 2360485 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2004).
88 See Elmendorf, supra note 84, at 647 (considering both federal and state voter ID decisions and 
finding that, as of 2008, “there have been fourteen votes by Democratic judges against the constitutionality 
of photo­ID requirements, and only three votes indicating that the requirement at issue is permissible. For 
Republican judges, the respective numbers are three (against constitutionality) and fifteen (for 
constitutionality).”
89 See Damon M. Cann & Teena Wilhelm, Case Visibility and the Electoral Connection in State 
Supreme Courts, 39 am. Pol. res. 557, 570 (2011).
90 See Andrea McArdle, The Increasingly Fractious Politics of  Nonpartisan Judicial Selection: 
Accountability Challenges to Merit-based Reform, 75 alb. l. rev. 1799, 1805–06 (2011–2012).
91 See e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of  Law, 62 
u. cHI. l. rev. 689, 694 (1995).
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process.92 For instance, courts in California, Iowa, and Tennessee ruled that the state 
could not disenfranchise the (former felon) plaintiffs who brought suit, thus limiting 
the scope of the states’ felon disenfranchisement laws; judges in these states are 
appointed initially and must withstand retention elections to keep their seats.93 These 
cases exemplify how appointed judges tend to rule broadly and independently of federal 
jurisprudence when construing their state constitutions’ grant of the right to vote, 
especially in cases involving felon disenfranchisement or the voting process.94 This find­
ing adds data to the robust and complex debate over methods of judicial selection.
V. CONCLUSION
There have been myriad calls for Congress or the federal courts to fix voting­rights 
jurisprudence to give broader protection to the individual right to vote.95 But the solu­
tion is in plain sight if state courts simply read state constitutions faithfully to their 
text and independently from federal jurisprudence. In locating the right to vote, we too 
often look solely at the implied right under the U.S. Constitution’s negative language 
and the Equal Protection Clause. Construing a voting regulation under the U.S. 
Constitution, however, presents only half of the inquiry. Almost all state constitutions 
grant citizens the right to vote through explicit, direct language. Yet many state courts 
interpret their own state’s constitution to be in lockstep with federal constitutional law.
This lockstepping approach is backwards. The U.S. Constitution directs the inquiry 
about voting qualifications to the states, not the other way around.96 Moreover, it 
makes little sense to lockstep a state constitution’s specific grant of voting rights with 
the very different implied right under the general language of the federal Equal 
Protection Clause. Courts construing restrictions on voting rights should consider the 
broader scope of state constitutions. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has contracted the scope of the right to vote 
under the federal Equal Protection Clause.97 A renewed, independent focus on state 
constitutions and their explicit grant of the right to vote is textually faithful to both 
the U.S. and state constitutions and will restore the importance of the most founda­
tional right in our democracy. The best way to achieve this renewed focus is to select 
judges who will embody and protect the fundamental importance of the right to vote.
92 For a detailed discussion of methods of judicial selection and recent state court voting rights cases, 
see Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 oHIo state L.J. 1 (forthcoming 2016).
93 League of Women Voters of Cal. v. McPherson, 145 Cal. App. 4th 1469 (Cal. App. 2006); Chiodo 
v. Section 43.24 Panel, 846 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 2014); May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2008).
94 See Douglas, supra note 92.
95 See, e.g., Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution: Confronting 
America’s Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 electIon l.J. 559, 572 (2004); see also Brad Plumer, ‘We Have 
to Fix That,’ but Will We?, wasH. Post (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/deci­
sion2012/we­ have­to­fix­that­but­will­we/2012/11/08/c83b4976­29ca­11e2­bab2­eda299503684_story.html.
96 u.s. const. art. I, § 2.
97 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 151–57.
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VI. APPENDIX98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106
STATe ConSTITuTIonS’ ConferrAl of The rIghT To VoTe
Explicit Grant of the  
Right to Vote
Elections Shall Be 
“Free,” “Free and 
Open,” or “Free  
and Equal”
Implicit Grant of 
the Right to Vote 
Through Negative 
Language
Alabama99
“shall have the right 
to vote”
Alaska100
“Every citizen … may 
vote”
Arizona101
“All elections shall be 
free and equal”
“No Person shall be 
entitled to 
vote … unless”;
“shall not be denied 
or abridged”
Arkansas102
“any person may 
vote”
“Elections shall be 
free and equal”
California103 “may vote”
“may not be condi-
tioned by a property 
qualification”
Colorado104
“shall be qualified to 
vote”
“free and open”
Connecticut105
“shall be … an 
elector”
“No person shall be 
denied … enjoyment 
of his or her civil or 
political rights”
Delaware106
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“All elections shall be 
free and equal”
Florida107 “shall be an elector”
98 This Appendix appeared initially in Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 
67 vanD. l. rev. 89, 144–49 (2014). It is reprinted here with permission.
99 ala. const. art. VIII, § 177.
100 alaska const. art. V, § 1.
101 arIz. const. art. II, § 21; id. art. VII, § 2.
102 ark. const. art. III, §§ 1–2.
103 cal. const. art. II, § 2; id. art. I, § 22.
104 colo. const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. II, § 5.
105 conn. const. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 20.
106 Del. const. art. V, § 2; id. art. I, § 3.
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Explicit Grant of the  
Right to Vote
Elections Shall Be 
“Free,” “Free and 
Open,” or “Free  
and Equal”
Implicit Grant of 
the Right to Vote 
Through Negative 
Language
Georgia108
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
Hawaii109
“shall be qualified to 
vote”
“No citizen shall be 
disfranchised, or 
deprived”
Idaho110 “is a qualified elector”
“No power … shall at 
any time interfere 
with … the right of 
suffrage”
Illinois111
“shall have the right 
to vote”
“All elections shall be 
free and equal”
Indiana112 “may vote”
“All elections shall be 
free and equal”
Iowa113
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
Kansas114
“shall be deemed a 
qualified elector”
Kentucky115 “shall be a voter”
“All elections shall be 
free and equal”
Louisiana116
“shall have the right 
to register and vote”
Maine117 “shall be an elector”
107 fla. const. art. VI, § 2.
108 Ga. const. art. II, § 1, ¶ II.
109 Haw. const. art. II, § 1; id. art. I, § 8.
110 IDaHo const. art. VI, § 2; id. art. I, §§ 19, 20.
111 Ill. const. art. III, §§ 1, 3.
112 InD. const. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
113 Iowa const. art. II, § 1.
114 kan. const. art. V, § 1.
115 ky. const. §§ 6, 145.
116 la. const. art. I, § 10(A).
117 me. const. art. II, § 1.
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Explicit Grant of the  
Right to Vote
Elections Shall Be 
“Free,” “Free and 
Open,” or “Free  
and Equal”
Implicit Grant of 
the Right to Vote 
Through Negative 
Language
Maryland118
“and every citi-
zen … ought to have 
the right of suffrage”; 
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“elections ought to be 
free and frequent”
Massachusetts119
“have an equal right 
to elect officers”
“All elections ought to 
be free”
Michigan120
“shall be an elector 
and qualified to 
vote”
Minnesota121
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“No member of this 
state shall be 
disfranchised”
Mississippi122
“is declared to be a 
qualified elector”
Missouri123 “are entitled to vote” “free and open”
Montana124 “is a qualified elector” “free and open” “No person shall be 
denied the equal 
protection of the 
laws”
Nebraska125 “shall … be an 
elector”
“shall be free”
Nevada126 “shall be entitled to 
vote”; also calls vot-
ing a “privilege”
“There shall be no 
denial of the elective 
franchise at any 
election”
118 mD. const. DeclaratIon of rIGHts, art. I, § 7; mD. const. art. I, § 1.
119 mass. const. pt. I, art. IX.
120 mIcH. const. art. II, § 1.
121 mInn. const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. I, § 2.
122 mIss. const. art. XII, § 241.
123 mo. const. art. VIII, § 2; id. art. I § 25.
124 mont. const. art. IV, § 2; id. art. II, §§ 4, 13.
125 neb. const. art. I, § 22; art. VI, § 1.
126 nev. const. art. II, § 1.
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Explicit Grant of the  
Right to Vote
Elections Shall Be 
“Free,” “Free and 
Open,” or “Free  
and Equal”
Implicit Grant of 
the Right to Vote 
Through Negative 
Language
New 
Hampshire127
“shall have an equal 
right to vote”
“All elections are to 
be free”
“The right to vote 
shall not be denied 
to any person 
because of the non-
payment of any 
tax.”
New Jersey128 “shall be entitled to 
vote”
New Mexico129 “shall be qualified to 
vote”
“All elections shall be 
free and open”
“and no 
power … shall at 
anytime interfere to 
prevent the free 
exercise of the right 
of suffrage”
New York130 “shall be entitled to 
vote”
North 
Carolina131
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“All elections shall be 
free”
North Dakota132
“shall be a qualified 
elector”
Ohio133
“has the qualifications 
of an elector”
Oklahoma134
“are qualified 
electors”
“the free exercise of 
the right of suffrage”
“The State shall 
never enact any law 
restricting or abridg-
ing the right of 
suffrage”
Oregon135 “is entitled to vote”
“All elections shall be 
free and equal”
127 n.H. const. pt. I, art. XI.
128 n.J. const. art. II, § 1, ¶ 3.
129 n.m. const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. II, § 8.
130 n.y. const. art. II, § 1.
131 n.c. const. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 10.
132 n.D. const. art. II, § 1.
133 oHIo const. art. V, § 1.
134 okla. const. art. III, § 1; id. art. II, § 4; id. art. I, § 6.
135 or. const. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
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Pennsylvania136
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“Elections shall be 
free and equal”
Rhode Island137
“shall have the right 
to vote”
South 
Carolina138
“shall have an equal 
right to elect offi-
cers”; “shall be an 
elector”; “is entitled 
to vote”
“free and open”
South Dakota139
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“free and equal” (two 
different clauses)
Tennessee140
“shall be entitled to 
vote … and there 
shall be no other 
qualification 
attached to the right 
of suffrage”
“free and equal”
“right of suf-
frage … shall never 
be denied to any 
person”
Texas141
“shall be deemed a 
qualified voter”
Utah142
“shall be entitled to 
vote in the election”
“All elections shall be 
free”
“The rights … to 
vote … shall not be 
denied or abridged”
136 Pa. const. art. VII, § 1; id. art. I, § 5.
137 r.I. const. art. II, § 1.
138 s.c. const. art. I, § 5; id. art. II, §§ 4, 5.
139 s.D. const. art. VI, § 19; id. art. VII, § 1, 2.
140 tenn. const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. I, § 5.
141 tex. const. art. VI, § 2.
142 utaH const. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; id. art. I, § 17.
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Vermont143
“all voters … have a 
right to elect offi-
cers”; “shall be enti-
tled to all the 
privileges of a voter”
“ought to be free and 
without corruption”
Virginia144
“all men … have the 
right of suffrage”
“all elections ought to 
be free”
Washington145
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“free and equal”
West Virginia146
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“Nor shall any per-
son be deprived by 
law, of any right, or 
privilege”
Wisconsin147 “is a qualified elector”
Wyoming148
“shall be entitled to 
vote”
“open, free, and 
equal”
“The rights … to 
vote … shall not be 
denied or abridged”
143 vt. const. ch. I, art. VIII; id. ch. II, § 42.
144 va. const. art. I, § 6.
145 wasH. const. art. VI, § 1; id. art. I, § 19.
146 w. va. const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. III, § 11.
147 wIs. const. art. III, § 1.
148 wyo. const. art. VI, §§ 1, 2; id. art. I, § 27.
